The Divine Command Theory proposes to bind humans to morality by identifying a lawgiver. For any authority or obligation there must be a lawgiver. There must be someone who establishes laws and makes them applicable to others.
For a Divine Command Theorist, God fits in well with the role of a lawgiver. He is omniscient and omnipotent. Divine Command Theorists are ordered to submit to His will and to carry out their obligations to the best of their ability. God is portrayed as the ultimate judge who sees and knows everything and therefore his entity demands that he is respected and submitted to.
For example Tom not only refrains from killing his friend, but understands that there is a great moral obligation for him to refrain from such an action because God, the ultimate legislator has ordered him to do so. The third appeal to the Divine Command Theory is highlighted by Harrison.
Rather they become sensitive to some being outside their sphere. This sensitivity makes the Divine Command Theory very attractive. There are many different theories of ethics however to motivate someone to do a moral action can be difficult. There is a great difference between knowing x is a moral action to do and actually carrying x out. Reason or rationality may provide sufficient information about morality but does not provide sufficient motivation to carry out moral acts.
There are several reasons why the Divine Command Theory motivates people to act morally. Firstly, the Divine Command Theory postulates that the one who acts morally will be rewarded for his actions. God takes account of all the good and bad actions and he will balance the scales by rewarding people for the good they have done.
This motivates people to do good even if it is difficult or if it is an apparent disadvantage. An example of this is to speak the truth to the accountant when he is working out the tax return.
It may seem disadvantageous to speak the truth as one can keep more money by paying less tax; however the thought of being rewarded by God for speaking the truth motivates the person to be transparent about his taxes to his accountant.
Secondly, just as reward motivates a person to do good, punishment deters a person to do bad. He argues that the ancient Greek 11 Ibid. Grube trans. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, , 7a. This brings about a contradiction. Euthyphro chooses option 1. He gives no reason as to why he chooses it and Socrates does not further quiz him.
As mentioned above, the Divine Command Theory holds that an action is good because God commands it and a bad action is that which is prohibited by God. The Divine Command Theorist has the following two options to choose from: 1. God commands certain actions because they are good in themselves 2. The Divine Command Theorist is committed to option number 2.
Therefore he 13 Ibid. So what he commands is good and what he prohibits is bad. Also, if a Divine Command Theorist commits to 1 then this results in morality being independent of God. God is no longer the creator of everything and if morality is independent of God, God has no say in what is good or bad. So for the Divine Command Theorist, the first option is inconsistent with the Divine Command Theory so it must be rejected.
The second option of the Euthyphro Dilemma gives rise to this objection. For a person to be morally good, the commands of God must be carried out and acted upon. However the idea that God commands himself is confusing. In conclusion to say God has a Good Will simply comes out as God commands as God commands, which seems trivial.
The second objection is the Anything Goes Objection. Furthermore there are examples in the scripture where God is assumed to have ordered what seems to be immoral. Although taking an innocent life is immoral, yet Abraham is ordered to take the life of his son for the sake of God. The very fact God is commanding this, justifies such an action to be moral.
The second example is that God commands the Israelites to plunder the Egyptians. The third example is that Prophet Hosea is commanded to have sexual relations with an adulteress. In all these examples God has ordered killing, theft and fornication. Are the things that God commanded us to do right? It seems that some actions could never be good but the Divine Command Theory seems to allow them. The third objection is the Arbitrariness objection. The Arbitrariness objection is also illustrated by the Euthyphro Dilemma.
The Divine Command Theorist is asked does 1. God command an action because it is good, or 2. The Divine Command Theorist is then asked what is the reason that God chooses such an action?
If he replies that x is the reason, then God drops out the picture and is no longer the origin of morality. God has become morally irrelevant and the Divine Command Theorist is forced to choose the first horn of the Dilemma.
This is untenable as the first horn of the Dilemma states that morality is independent of God, a conclusion which the Divine Command Theorist cannot commit to.
If this is so then God has dropped out the picture. This means that God has nothing really to do with morality and is no longer morally relevant. A morality based on such conclusions cannot be taken seriously.
What is the reason behind God commanding an action? The options are summarised as follows; A. God commands an action due to a certain reason. If this is the case then the Divine Command Theorist is forced to commit to the first horn of the Dilemma, that God commands an action because it is good.
Plato, the great philosopher of Athens, was born in BCE. In early manhood an admirer of Socrates, he later founded the famous school of philosophy in the grove Academus. Much else recorded of his life is uncertain; that he left Athens for a time after Socrates' execution is probable; that later he went to Cyrene, Egypt, and Sicily is possible; that he was wealthy is likely; that he was critical of 'advanced' democracy is obvious. He lived to be 80 years old.
Linguistic tests including those of computer science still try to establish the order of his extant philosophical dialogues, written in splendid prose and revealing Socrates' mind fused with Plato's thought. In Laches, Charmides, and Lysis, Socrates and others discuss separate ethical conceptions. Protagoras, Ion, and Meno discuss whether righteousness can be taught.
In Gorgias, Socrates is estranged from his city's thought, and his fate is impending. The Apology not a dialogue , Crito, Euthyphro, and the unforgettable Phaedo relate the trial and death of Socrates and propound the immortality of the soul. Taking place during the weeks leading up to Socrates' trial, the dialogue features Socrates and Euthyphro, a man known for claiming to be a religious expert. They attempt to pinpoint a definition for piety. Lysis is a dialogue of Plato which discusses the nature of friendship.
It is generally classified as an early dialogue. The main characters are Socrates, the The Laches is a Socratic dialogue written by Plato. But just at present I would rather hear from you a more precise answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend, to the question, What is 'piety'?
When asked, you only replied, Doing as you do, charging your father with murder. Do you not recollect that there was one idea which made the impious impious, and the pious pious?
SOCRATES: Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure actions, whether yours or those of any one else, and then I shall be able to say that such and such an action is pious, such another impious. But whether what you say is true or not I cannot as yet tell, although I make no doubt that you will prove the truth of your words. That thing or person which is dear to the gods is pious, and that thing or person which is hateful to the gods is impious, these two being the extreme opposites of one another.
Was not that said? Suppose for example that you and I, my good friend, differ about a number; do differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with one another? Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a sum?
I dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment, and therefore I will suggest that these enmities arise when the matters of difference are the just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable.
Are not these the points about which men differ, and about which when we are unable satisfactorily to decide our differences, you and I and all of us quarrel, when we do quarrel? Compare Alcib.
SOCRATES: They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and evil, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable: there would have been no quarrels among them, if there had been no such differences—would there now?
SOCRATES: But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just and others as unjust,—about these they dispute; and so there arise wars and fightings among them. For I certainly did not ask you to tell me what action is both pious and impious: but now it would seem that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. And therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising your father you may very likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and there may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion.
EUTHYPHRO: I should rather say that these are the questions which they are always arguing, especially in courts of law: they commit all sorts of crimes, and there is nothing which they will not do or say in their own defence.
SOCRATES: Then there are some things which they do not venture to say and do: for they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be unpunished, but they deny their guilt, do they not?
SOCRATES: Then they do not argue that the evil-doer should not be punished, but they argue about the fact of who the evil-doer is, and what he did and when? SOCRATES: And the gods are in the same case, if as you assert they quarrel about just and unjust, and some of them say while others deny that injustice is done among them.
For surely neither God nor man will ever venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be punished? SOCRATES: But they join issue about the particulars—gods and men alike; and, if they dispute at all, they dispute about some act which is called in question, and which by some is affirmed to be just, by others to be unjust. Is not that true? SOCRATES: Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tell me, for my better instruction and information, what proof have you that in the opinion of all the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in chains by the master of the dead man, and dies because he is put in chains before he who bound him can learn from the interpreters of the gods what he ought to do with him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf of such an one a son ought to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder.
How would you show that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act? Prove to me that they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as I live. SOCRATES: I understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick of apprehension as the judges: for to them you will be sure to prove that the act is unjust, and hateful to the gods. There was a notion that came into my mind while you were speaking; I said to myself: 'Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to me that all the gods regarded the death of the serf as unjust, how do I know anything more of the nature of piety and impiety?
But I will amend the definition so far as to say that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love pious or holy; and what some of them love and others hate is both or neither. Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety? But whether this admission will greatly assist you in the task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to consider.
What do you say? The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods. You know that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know also in what the difference lies? SOCRATES: And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely, visible because it is seen; nor is a thing led because it is in the state of being led, or carried because it is in the state of being carried, but the converse of this.
And now I think, Euthyphro, that my meaning will be intelligible; and my meaning is, that any state of action or passion implies previous action or passion. It does not become because it is becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes; neither does it suffer because it is in a state of suffering, but it is in a state of suffering because it suffers.
Do you not agree? SOCRATES: But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same with that which is dear to God, and is loved because it is holy, then that which is dear to God would have been loved as being dear to God; but if that which is dear to God is dear to him because loved by him, then that which is holy would have been holy because loved by him.
But now you see that the reverse is the case, and that they are quite different from one another. For one theophiles is of a kind to be loved cause it is loved, and the other osion is loved because it is of a kind to be loved.
Thus you appear to me, Euthyphro, when I ask you what is the essence of holiness, to offer an attribute only, and not the essence—the attribute of being loved by all the gods. But you still refuse to explain to me the nature of holiness. And therefore, if you please, I will ask you not to hide your treasure, but to tell me once more what holiness or piety really is, whether dear to the gods or not for that is a matter about which we will not quarrel ; and what is impiety?
For somehow or other our arguments, on whatever ground we rest them, seem to turn round and walk away from us. SOCRATES: Your words, Euthyphro, are like the handiwork of my ancestor Daedalus; and if I were the sayer or propounder of them, you might say that my arguments walk away and will not remain fixed where they are placed because I am a descendant of his.
But now, since these notions are your own, you must find some other gibe, for they certainly, as you yourself allow, show an inclination to be on the move. And the beauty of it is, that I would rather not. For I would give the wisdom of Daedalus, and the wealth of Tantalus, to be able to detain them and keep them fixed. But enough of this. As I perceive that you are lazy, I will myself endeavour to show you how you might instruct me in the nature of piety; and I hope that you will not grudge your labour.
Tell me, then—Is not that which is pious necessarily just? But, as I was saying, revered friend, the abundance of your wisdom makes you lazy. Please to exert yourself, for there is no real difficulty in understanding me. What I mean I may explain by an illustration of what I do not mean. The poet Stasinus sings—. SOCRATES: I should not say that where there is fear there is also reverence; for I am sure that many persons fear poverty and disease, and the like evils, but I do not perceive that they reverence the objects of their fear.
SOCRATES: But where reverence is, there is fear; for he who has a feeling of reverence and shame about the commission of any action, fears and is afraid of an ill reputation.
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